

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, NIC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

6 October 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDCI has copy

2.

3.

DCI

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

C/NIC (7E47 HQS)

14.

15.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Chairman
National Intelligence Council

6 October 1986


NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI

Understand you have seen this -- along with a review by Fritz Ermarth. In general, I agree with Fritz' rejoinder. As previously noted, [] work can be thought-provoking, but also wrong-headed on occasion, and always wordy -- this is a case in point. This, by the way, is also [] last piece under his old contract -- which ran out this week and, per our discussion, was not renewed. Graham Fuller and I have discussed this with Harry. We are considering using him on a more sparing basis to help Fred Hutchinson and/or John Bird -- at lower cost to us, and in a manner more directly relevant to what Harry can best contribute.

25X1

25X1

V/R



Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III

Attachment:

Memo dtd 2 Oct 86, Subj:
Gorbachev's Intentions at Reykjavik

clerc
[Signature]

SECRET

2 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : Special Assistant for Warning 25X1

SUBJECT : Gorbachev's Intentions at Reykjavik

1. Gorbachev will avoid heavy-handed polemics at the "preparatory meeting" but he will be much more assertive in pressing the Soviet case than he was at the Geneva summit. He cannot afford a repetition of the Geneva outcome because this would revive the domestic criticisms of his performance that placed him on the defensive in the months following the first summit. The General Secretary will combine sanguine rhetoric about promising prospects for halting the arms race, reducing tensions, and restoring detente with a number of specific proposals for agreements: an end to nuclear testing, reduction of INF in Europe, constraints on strategic defenses, elimination of chemical weapons, and cuts in conventional forces in Europe. Gorbachev will contend that the Administration's response to these proposals will constitute a decisive test of whether a formal summit meeting in the US can be held late this year or early in 1987. He will not agree to set a date for a visit to the US unless or until the Administration offers a response in the next two months that satisfies his repeated insistence that a summit must reach agreement on at least one or two specific arms control issues and take place in "an appropriate political atmosphere."

2. Although the General Secretary personally would welcome the publicity and prestige benefits that would flow from a visit to the US, his public pronouncements since last winter strongly suggest that he recognizes that a failure to secure substantially more than he did at Geneva would seriously undermine his political authority at home. A plausible case could be made that Gorbachev's statements and actions in the last eight months have been motivated by an urgent need to erase the image of the embarrassing outcome of the Geneva summit, to get off the hook of his agreement to hold two subsequent meetings, and to corner the Administration into taking responsibility for aborting a second summit. He may see the Reykjavik meeting as the culmination of these maneuvers and as an opportunity to repair the damage to his credibility and authority at home caused by the failure of his original summit scenario.

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

3. The Soviet leaders probably were surprised by the President's prompt acceptance (conditioned on Daniloff's release) of Gorbachev's proposal for an early meeting. They had expected that this proposal would be rejected or ignored, given the White House response to Gorbachev's bid on 29 March for a meeting in London, Rome, or another European capital to agree to ban nuclear testing--a bid that he renewed on 15 May, along with the suggestion of Hiroshima as an alternative site. This surprise almost certainly has triggered grumbling among skeptics of summitry in the Soviet elite and revived anxieties about Gorbachev's ability to protect Soviet interests against Administration maneuvers to use this meeting to "cover up" its military programs and "deceive world opinion." As recently as 14 September, Sergei Plekhanov and Radomir Bogdanov, senior members of the USA and Canada Institute, expressed opposition to a new summit without assured "progress on at least one or two major substantive points concerning the arms race." They cited the danger of American "window-dressing" to create an illusion of progress and to "cover up" a military buildup and a "break-through to outer space." These suspicions and anxieties will place strong constraints on Gorbachev's conduct of the talks and reinforce his incentives to come away with much more tangible results than he secured at the Geneva summit.

4. In view of the protracted Soviet effort to maneuver the Administration into postponing or scuttling the second summit, Gorbachev probably had intended to make public his 19 September proposal for an early meeting after the expected White House rejection. The President's acceptance of the proposal, however, will not alter Gorbachev's long-standing political imperatives and intentions. The General Secretary will arrive in Reykjavik with the conviction that the President's decision has brought to a head a high-stakes contest to persuade foreign opinion, particularly in Western Europe, that the rival superpower is solely responsible for international tensions, the arms race, and the impasse in arms control. Gorbachev's most recent public statements reveal no disposition to modify the line he has been following since the Soviet Party Congress last February. His remarks to Czechoslovakia's Rude Pravo on 8 September closely paralleled his interview with Time editors on 30 August 1985 in which he accused the Administration of waging a "campaign of hatred" and setting the stage for a combative Geneva summit. He told Rude Pravo that "It is not worth having a meeting for the sake of 'nothing'" and he asked, "what is there to negotiate about" if the US rejects a nuclear testing moratorium and blocks agreement on other arms control issues? Gorbachev contended that "in an atmosphere of a frantic arms race, fueling of tension, and demolition of existing treaties, a summit meeting is hardly going to be of any use." His preoccupation with the criticisms

SECRET

-3-

SECRET

of domestic skeptics was evident in his charge that the Administration wanted to use summits merely to "deceive people, to reassure the public by creating a semblance of well-being and at the same time continue a dangerous policy....By fueling false optimism this way, they are reckoning on making sure that they shift the responsibility for the results of their destructive policy onto the Soviet Union." Gorbachev repeated this theme at Stavropol on 19 September, asking, "Why meet again in order just to talk?...But we did this in Geneva." He complained that despite the Geneva agreement to accelerate arms control negotiations, "all (US) military programs are still on course and there seems to be no wish for accord."

5. These pronouncements underscore Gorbachev's prime concern to prevent his second encounter with the President from being interpreted by the Soviet elite as another case of his having been duped or "taken in" by a wily American President. He probably feels that such an outcome would irreparably damage his authority as party leader. Given his surprise, and perhaps even dismay, at the President's boldness in calling his bluff, Gorbachev will seek to seize the initiative at the outset of the meeting and will make strenuous efforts to shape the discussions so as to place the President on the defensive. Shevardnadze on 30 September hinted at this strategy when he said the purpose of the Reykjavik meeting would be to impart "extra-powerful stimuli" to arms control negotiations by issuing "clear instructions" for the preparation of draft agreements that could be signed later at a full summit in the US. Boris Pyadyshev, the Foreign Ministry's deputy spokesman, declared on 1 October that Gorbachev would put forward "two or three draft agreements", citing a nuclear testing ban and reduction of INF as "possible areas of agreement."

6. Gorbachev will press hard to accord top priority to an end to nuclear testing. The Soviets have long believed that this is by far their most potent issue in the contest for European opinion, particularly in the runup to West Germany's federal elections on 25 January. Shevardnadze remarked on 1 October that "The ending of nuclear testing will figure prominently, if not take the central place, at the summit meeting." Gorbachev declared on 8 September that a government's attitude toward ending tests "is a test of historical maturity" and a "touchstone for verifying...the main content of a nuclear state's foreign policy." The Soviets of course are fully aware that the Administration will not accept a total ban on testing, and they are operating on the assumption that the President's position on this issue will not go beyond the terms he used in his 22 September address to the UN General Assembly. Gorbachev, in fact, will base his tactics on the expectation that he will not be faced with any

SECRET

-4-

SECRET

American surprises on arms control issues. Parenthetically, the Soviets probably attribute the President's agreement to meet in Reykjavik to his desire to enhance Republican chances of retaining control of the Senate in the congressional elections. This assessment will reinforce Gorbachev's incentive to convert the meeting into a decisive "touchstone" on nuclear testing and SDI and to disabuse the world of "false optimism" about the Administration's policies.

7. In addition to introducing draft agreements on a nuclear test ban, prohibition of space weapons, and INF reductions, Gorbachev will attempt to dominate the discussions by proposing that detailed instructions be issued to negotiating teams for concluding agreements to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty, to eliminate chemical weapons (specifically banning binary weapons), and to reduce conventional forces in Europe, based on the Warsaw Pact proposal last June for a 25 percent cut in forces and armaments "from the Atlantic to the Urals." He may also propose that the two governments pledge to observe the "relevant provisions" of the SALT II treaty.

8. The General Secretary, moreover, will seek to monopolize the initiative at Reykjavik by announcing several unilateral actions calculated to grab the headlines. (a) He may inform the President (and the world) that six Soviet regiments have begun to withdraw from Afghanistan. Shevardnadze hinted at such an initiative on 1 October when he said it is "entirely possible" that the meeting will deal with Afghanistan. (b) The General Secretary may announce plans for significant reductions in Soviet and East European armed forces during the next 3 to 6 months. (c) He may state that Soviet forces in East Germany and Hungary will be reduced in the next year, and he may portray this as the first phase of a complete withdrawal provided the US agrees to remove its forces from Europe. The Soviets have been preparing a public relations initiative on troop withdrawals for some time. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 23 September, Shevardnadze echoed a line Gorbachev used during his visit to Warsaw in July: "We would generally not want our troops to be present anywhere beyond our national borders."

9. Gorbachev will come to Reykjavik primed for a showdown over the Administration's order expelling 25 members of the Soviet UN Mission. He will adopt an unyielding stance because the Soviets have persuaded themselves that the Administration's position is untenable, particularly in light of the UN Secretary General's public statement that the expulsion order is "incompatible" with the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the US. An intention to stonewall was foreshadowed by the Foreign Ministry deputy spokesman's statement on 1 October that

SECRET

-5-

SECRET

"All of the Soviet citizens on the American list, except 6 or 7 who are abroad or on leave, are in place in New York." This, he claimed, "means that we reached a certain understanding on this question." Gorbachev's tactic will be to place the burden on the President for raising this issue and insisting that the 25 Soviets depart by 14 October. Gorbachev will underscore previous Soviet warnings that if the Administration enforces the expulsion order, Moscow will retaliate. Shevardnadze stated on 30 September that Moscow has prepared "appropriate retaliatory measures" that will be "rather major and painful." There will be a high probability that the Soviets will expel an equal number of American Embassy personnel.

10. In sum, the prospect is for a confused and inconclusive outcome at Reykjavik. If the expulsions issue reaches a showdown, Gorbachev may stage a public show of defiance. In the discussions, the General Secretary will again exaggerate his ability to back the President into a corner on nuclear testing, SDI, and other major arms control issues. He will be at pains to avoid the impression he created in Moscow of being excessively accommodating at Geneva and reluctant to press Soviet interests. (In his news conference at Geneva, he seemed almost apologetic about criticizing the President's commitment to SDI). But neither a more assertive manner nor transparent attempts to oblige the President to reject ostensibly constructive initiatives will enable Gorbachev to escape the dilemma created by his ill-considered foray into summitry, against the judgment and advice of senior party leaders such as Gromyko. If the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting is another draw, which in practice works to the President's advantage, Gorbachev's political strategy toward the US will have reached something of a dead end. He will then have little choice but to retreat to a more hostile stance and curtail contacts until the President's term ends. He will have foreclosed the option of a more flexible policy in dealing with the Administration because his rivals and critics in the Soviet hierarchy would attack such a course as virtual capitulation. Gorbachev is still a long way from exposing himself to charges of "harebrained schemes" that brought Nikita Khrushchev down, but his management of policy toward the US during his first 19 months in office has raised awkward questions about his judgment which are bound to impair his authority and credibility in pursuing domestic reforms and reconstruction.

SECRET